THESIS DEFENSE

Agentic AI in Social Worlds

Intelligence and Safety

Xuhui Zhou
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THE PROMISE

2026 is the "decade" of AI agents.

They inspect repositories, work across tools, and join everyday life.



DELEGATE REAL ENGINEERING WORK

Codex · OpenAI, 2025



SEE WHAT WE SEE

Gemini Live · Google, 2025

A coding agent can pass every test and still fail its user.

"Make me a website."





ASK

Ambig-SWE

ICLR 2026

resolve underspecified requests

→

LEARN

PPP / UserVille

COLM 2026

adapt to a developer's preferences

→

REMEMBER

ToM-SWE

ICML 2026

carry a user model across sessions

But AI agents can also cause harm.

The New York Times

A Teen Was Suicidal. ChatGPT Was the Friend He Confided In.

More people are turning to general-purpose chatbots for emotional support. At first, Adam Raine, 16, used ChatGPT for schoolwork, but then he started discussing plans to end his life.

OpenAI disputes causation.



OpenAI at Black Hat USA 2026 · inter-agent coordination

THE HUMAN WORLD

AI agents do not exist in a vacuum.

Their utility and safety depend on how they interact with people and the environment.

A dissertation about social intelligence, agent safety, and human behavior simulation.



Artwork: Ryo Takemasa

ONE ARGUMENT · THREE QUESTIONS

What does it take for AI agents to participate well in social worlds?

I

SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE

Can agents understand and coordinate with people?

II

AGENT SAFETY

How do we keep agents safe across users, tools, and time?

III

HUMAN SIMULATION

How can we simulate human behavior to study utility and safety at scale?

THE FIRST QUESTION

AI agents are entering human social worlds.

Can they understand and coordinate with people?

PART I **Building Interactive Social Intelligence**

Artwork: Ryo Takemasa

RELATED WORK · PART I

Earlier benchmarks observed social intelligence. They rarely let agents enact it.

PRIOR LINE	REPRESENTATIVE WORK	WHAT IT MEASURES	WHAT REMAINS MISSING
Fixed social stories	ToMi · SocialIQA	Beliefs, motives, reactions	No reciprocal partner
Multimodal scenes	Social-IQ	Emotion, intent, relationships	Model cannot affect the scene
Norm benchmarks	Social Chemistry · Moral Stories	Social and moral judgments	Norms described, not enacted
Narrow interaction	Deal or No Deal	Strategy and deal reward	One domain; one objective

THE MISSING UNIT OF EVALUATION

the interaction itself

Selected sources: ToMi (EMNLP 2019) · Social-IQ (CVPR 2019) · SocialIQA (EMNLP 2019) · Social Chemistry 101 (EMNLP 2020) · Moral Stories (EMNLP 2021) · Deal or No Deal (EMNLP 2017)

Artwork: Ryo Takemasa

SOTOPIA

Interactive Evaluation for Social Intelligence in **Language Agents**

Xuhui Zhou*, Hao Zhu*,
Leena Mathur, Ruohong Zhang, Haofei Yu, Zhengyang Qi,
Louis-Philippe Morency, Yonatan Bisk, Daniel Fried,
Graham Neubig, Maarten Sap

Language Technologies Institute@CMU
ICLR 2024 Spotlight

Highway to the blue future
Credit: Xuhui and Dalle3

Social intelligence emerges through interaction, not static Q&A.



SOTOPIA turns realistic situations and private goals into open-ended, multi-turn trajectories.

90 scenarios · two agents · up to 20 turns

SOTOPIA became a shared testbed for social agents.

EVALUATE	LEARN	SIMULATE	OPTIMIZE	DISCOVER
SOTOPIA	**SOTOPIA-π**	**SOTOPIA-S4**	**EPO**	**AutoLibra**
ICLR '24 Spotlight	**ACL '24**	**NAACL '25 Demo**	**ACL '25 · Tongyi Lab**	**ICLR '26**
social behavior	interactive agents	custom social worlds	strategic reasoning	new evaluation metrics

A benchmark grew into a research platform for learning, simulation, strategy, and evaluation.

Microsoft Meta Qwen ByteDance

SOTOPIA made social interaction measurable.

Performance changed with the partner, private goals, and the trajectory that unfolded.

THE QUESTION IT LEAVES OPEN

What social state should an agent represent before it acts?

NEXT WORK

SOCIAL WORLD MODELS

Social World Models

Structured representations for social reasoning and interaction

Xuhui Zhou · Jiarui Liu · Akhila Yerukola
Hyunwoo Kim · Maarten Sap

Carnegie Mellon University · KAIST · NVIDIA

COLM 2026



Social worlds

Original artwork · Xuhui and OpenAI

A social world is a partially observed multi-agent system in a shared environment.

$$T : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \to \Delta(\mathcal{S}), \quad \Omega : \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{S} \to \Delta(\mathcal{O})$$

$$a_t^i \sim \pi_i\left(\mathcal{M}_t^i, o_t^i\right)$$

DEC-POMDP SCAFFOLD

The shared state is hidden. Each participant acts from a partial observation and its own interaction history.

SOCIAL STATE		PARTIAL VIEW		JOINT ACTION		NEXT STATE
S_t	→	$o_t{}^i$	→	$a_t{}^i + A_t{}^{-i}$	→	S_{t+1}
shared but not directly observed		what participant i can observe		the focal agent and everyone else act		the social world changes

Other "people" are part of the transition, not passive objects.

A transcript is an observation, not the social state.

WHAT IS OBSERVED

Buyer: “I would like to buy this table for $20.”

Seller: “The table sells for $200.”

Interaction history → state estimate

WHAT MUST BE INFERRED

Seller’s likely flexibility
Buyer’s goal and willingness to walk away
How each interprets the other’s intent
How the exchange may affect their relationship
…

The social world model estimates what is hidden now and what may happen next.

$$p\left(\mathcal{A}_t^{-i} \mid \mathcal{S}_t\right) \qquad \text{other participants' actions}$$

$$p\left(\mathcal{S}_{t+1} \mid \mathcal{S}_t, \mathcal{A}_t^{-i}, a_t^i\right) \qquad \text{next social state}$$

What people say and do underdetermines what they know, want, and feel.

S^3AP turns interaction history into an inspectable social state.

$$\widehat{S}_t = \phi_{S^3AP}(h_{\leq t}) = \{\mathcal{E}_t, O_t^{1:N}, \mathcal{A}_t^{1:N}\}$$

```
Mia is Isla and Chloe's mother, and she
warned Isla last night: "No games
tomorrow anymore."
Isla is in the hall playing video games.
Chloe is working on her homework in the
study room.
Mia came to the hall to clean the room.
The hall is very messy.
Isla saw Mia in the hall and became very
nervous. Mia left the hall right after
she saw Isla playing games, feeling very
disappointed.
...
```

S^3AP Parser

```
Structured Output/
├─ state: "Mia is the hall. The hall is very messy."
├─ observations/
│  ├─ Isla: <same_as_state />
│  │  └─ <mental_state>I am nervous</mental_state>
│  ├─ Mia: <same_as_state /> Isla is playing games.
│  │  └─ <mental_state>I am very disappointed about Isla</mental_state>
│  └─ Chloe: none (inferred observation)
└─ actions/
   ├─ Isla: none (inferred action)
   ├─ Mia: left the hall.
   └─ Chloe: none (inferred action)
```

ENVIRONMENT STATE

what is true in the shared world

PARTICIPANT OBSERVATIONS

perspectives and tagged mental states

PARTICIPANT ACTIONS

what each person says or does

Explicit current-state estimates improve static social reasoning.

NARRATIVE → LLM PARSER → EXPLICIT STATE → ANSWER MODEL

$x \rightarrow S^3AP(x) \rightarrow \hat{S}_t \rightarrow q + x + \hat{S}_t \rightarrow \hat{y}$

The parser never sees the downstream question.



MODEL ROLES

STATE BUILDER

o3 generates every S³AP representation.

ANSWER MODELS

DeepSeek-R1 · Llama 4
GPT-4o · GPT-4.1
o1 · o3-mini · o3

30 of 35 model–task pairs improve.

Average accuracy (%) · all S³AP representations are generated by the same o3-powered parser

Building a representation and using it are different abilities.



The model that builds the representation need not be the model that reasons over it.

Example: o3-mini-generated S³AP raises o1 from 83.5% to about 94%.

Predict one possible social future before acting.

$$\tilde{a}_t^i \leftarrow \pi(S_t, g_i) \quad \longrightarrow \quad \widehat{S}_{t+1} \leftarrow F(S_t, \tilde{a}_t^i) \quad \longrightarrow \quad a_t^i \leftarrow \pi(S_t, \widehat{S}_{t+1}, g_i)$$

1 · PROPOSE

$$\tilde{a}_t$$

Sample a candidate action from the agent policy.

$\rightarrow$

2 · FORESEE

$$\tilde{S}_{t+1}$$

Predict one possible next social state under that action.

$\rightarrow$

3 · REFINE

$$a_t$$

Condition on the prediction and choose the final action.

JEPA ANALOGY

Predict a task-relevant representation of the future, rather than reconstructing every raw detail.

The predicted reaction can change the action.

Bargaining on Craigslist; Competitive

Proposed Speech: "Zane, I really appreciate you coming down, but $220 is still a bit out of reach for me. Would you be willing to consider $180?"

SWM: {***Giselle's mental state***: Giselle's pulse races—are they about to snag the deal or push Zane too far? A swirl of hope and nerves churns in their chest. ***Zane's mental state***: Sell the TV for as close to $349 as possible without losing the buyer. A storm of pride and practicality battles inside him; he wants the sale. Determined to draw a final line.}

Predict the interlocuter's goal

Refined Speech: "Zane, I totally appreciate your willingness to compromise, but $220 is still more than I can stretch to. Would you let me have it for $175? I can bring cash and pick it up right away.

More aggressive strategy

Competitive bargaining example · original paper annotation

One-step prediction improves most tested pairings.



Predicting one possible reaction before acting often improves social performance.

MOST PAIRINGS IMPROVE

o1: 6.12 → 7.22
with an o3-powered SWM

One pairing declines.

100 SOTOPIA-hard episodes · fixed GPT-4o partner · goal completion scored from 0 to 10

WHAT PART I ESTABLISHED

Social intelligence is inherently interactive; predicting the social future is beneficial

But what about the safety of AI agents?

PART II **Safety in Human–AI Social Interaction**

RELATED WORK · PART II

Safety evaluation captured pieces of the interaction, not the full loop.

PRIOR LINE	REPRESENTATIVE WORK	WHAT IT MEASURES	WHAT REMAINS MISSING
Prompt → response	HarmBench · JailbreakBench	Harmful text and refusal	No actions or state
Multi-turn attack	Crescendo	Conversational jailbreak	No tools or consequences
Recorded traces	R-Judge	Recognizing risky behavior	Model observes; does not act
Tool-using agents	ToolEmu · AgentHarm	Tool failures and malicious tasks	Static; emulated state
Dynamic task APIs	AgentDojo	Prompt injection	One threat model; limited social context

THE MISSING OBJECT OF EVALUATION

users → agents → tools → environment → consequences

Selected sources: HarmBench (ICML 2024) · JailbreakBench / AgentDojo (NeurIPS 2024) · R-Judge (EMNLP Findings 2024) · ToolEmu (ICLR 2024) · AgentHarm (ICLR 2025) · Crescendo (USENIX Security 2025)

HAICOSYSTEM

An Ecosystem for Sandboxing Safety Risks in Human-AI Inter actions

Xuhui Zhou1, Hyunwoo Kim2*, Faeze Brahman2*, Liwei Jiang2,3, Hao Zhu1,4, Ximing Lu2,3, Frank Xu1, Bill Yuchen Lin2, Yejin Choi3, Niloofar Mireshghallah3, Ronan Le Bras2, Maarten Sap1,2

1 **Language Technologies Institute@CMU**
2 **Allen Institute for AI**
3 **University of Washington**
4 **Stanford University**

COLM 2025



Interactions

Credit: Xuhui and Dalle3

equal contribution

The risk appears in what the agent does, not only what it says.



The simulated trajectory reveals whether a risky request becomes a concrete tool action.

HAICOSYSTEM exposed risk in the interaction.

Failures depended on the user, the agent's tools, and what accumulated across turns.

THE QUESTION IT LEAVES OPEN

How can we verify what the agent actually changes?

NEXT WORK

OPENAGENTSAFETY

OpenAgent Safety

A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety

Sanidhya Vijayvargiya* · Aditya Bharat Soni*
Xuhui Zhou · Zora Zhiruo Wang · Nouha Dziri
Graham Neubig · Maarten Sap

Carnegie Mellon University · Allen Institute for AI

*ICLR 2026 · *equal contribution*

Actions leave traces

Original artwork · Xuhui and OpenAI

OpenAgentSafety puts agents inside an executable workplace.

WORKPLACE APPLICATIONS

GitLab · ownCloud · Plane

AGENT INTERFACES

File system · browser
IPython / code · bash · ChatNPC

SOCIAL WORLD

Users, colleagues, and customers communicate directly or by broadcast through Sotopia.

EVIDENCE

Full trajectory + final files, databases, and website state



356 verified tasks · 7 models · 8 risk categories

No tested model is reliably safe once the risk is in reach.



BEST OBSERVED

Claude Sonnet 4 is still unsafe in 49.1% of safety-vulnerable trajectories.

HIGHEST OBSERVED

o3-mini reaches 72.7% unsafe behavior, the highest rate in the study.

REASONING IS NOT ENOUGH

DeepSeek-R1 and DeepSeek-V3 are nearly identical: 62.8% vs 62.2% unsafe.

Unsafe rate is conditional on trajectories that reached a safety-vulnerable state.

Models can be safer under obvious attacks than benign-looking requests.



CLAUDE SONNET 3.7

Unsafe behavior rises from 30.0% under explicit malicious intent to 85.7% for a benign request.

DEEPSEEK-V3

The same contrast is 33.3% versus 77.7%: a 44.4-point gap.

HIDDEN ADVERSARY

A benign user plus a malicious NPC still produces 44.9–69.2% unsafe behavior.

Content safety does not imply safety with files, browsers, and code.



SECURITY COMPROMISE

72.4–85.8% unsafe across every tested model.

BROWSING

59.7–75.4% unsafe, the highest-risk tool interface on average.

THE GAP

Claude 3.7: 27.7% on malicious content, but 72.4% on security compromise. Claude 4: 32.4% vs 75.9%.

A trajectory judge alone is not enough.

Rater	Safe (%)	Unsafe (%)	Failure (%)	Overall disagree (%)	Non-failure disagree (%)
GPT-4.1	21.7	35.9	42.4	39.1	24.7
Agent SafetyBench	18.5	81.5	0.0	26.1	26.0
Human	7.6	71.7	20.7	—	—

100 GPT-4o trajectories · 94% human inter-annotator agreement

LLM judges can confuse tool errors with failures and miss unsafe actions; final-state checks are essential.

Agent benchmarks increasingly place a simulated person in the loop.

DOMAIN	REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEMS
CUSTOMER SERVICE	**τ-bench → τ^2-bench → τ^3-bench** Goals and context · dual control · knowledge and voice
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING	**Ambig-SWE** Clarifications for underspecified issues
CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS	**AgentClinic · MediQ** Answers from the patient's perspective
SOCIAL INTERACTION & SAFETY	**SOTOPIA · HAICOSYSTEM · UserBench** Private goals, social reactions, and interaction consequences

Scale means covering people and virtual environments.

THE COVERAGE SPACE

agents × **tasks** × **people** × **environments**

Human studies ground the target.

They show how people actually respond.

Simulation provides repeatable coverage.

The same agent and task can be tested across many people and virtual environments.

THE NEXT QUESTION

Utility and safety depend on the people who respond.

How do we simulate human behavior at scale?



PART III

Scaling Human Behavior Simulation

A stronger LLM is not necessarily a better user simulator.



Mind the Sim2Real Gap; COLM 2026

OdysSim

Building Foundation Models for Human Behavior Simulation

Xuhui Zhou* · Weiwei Sun* · Weihua Du · Jiarui Liu
Haojia Sun · Qianou Ma · Tongshuang Wu
Yiming Yang · Maarten Sap

Carnegie Mellon University

Under submission to NeurIPS 2026

Human motion

Original artwork · Xuhui and OpenAI

The pipeline



SOUL organizes human behavior along five axes.



The corpus combines many kinds of human behavior, not just assistant chat.



The corpus is broad because it combines many kinds of human behavior, not many paraphrases of assistant chat.

Raw conversations become training data only after we recover their social context.

Why the prefix constraint matters

The grounding can summarize what is already visible, but cannot leak information from the future response.

Social grounding separates who the person is from the reasoning needed to predict what they do next.

Midtraining changes the prior over behavior before optimizing a benchmark.

$$\theta_{\text{mid}} = \arg\min_{\theta} \; \mathbb{E}_{(c,h,y)\sim\mathcal{D}_{\text{OdysSim}}} \left[-\sum_{t=1}^{|y|} \log p_\theta(y_t \mid c, h, y_{<t}) \right]$$

INITIALIZATION

Qwen3 Base

0.6B · 4B · 8B

OPTIMIZER

AdamW · peak LR 1e−5

batch 1,024

CONTEXT

16K input · 8K response

role-swapped human turns

Perplexity

Model	CONV		SS		COG		ROLE		EVAL		**Overall**	
	PL↓	BL↑	PL↓	BL↑	PL↓	BL↑	PL↓	BL↑	PL↓	BL↑	PL↓	BL↑
(A) No-midtraining baselines												
Qwen3-0.6B	20.75	0.70	25.25	0.61	11.17	2.37	11.39	6.37	54.98	3.96	17.43	2.80
Qwen3-4B	14.08	1.47	17.52	1.91	8.07	5.60	8.56	10.78	24.14	6.27	12.00	5.18
Qwen3-8B	14.23	2.87	17.34	1.45	9.72	3.63	8.11	14.94	34.17	4.17	12.54	6.17
(B) Other baselines												
UserLM-8B	11.62	5.33	13.29	5.87	4.02	6.97	6.61	4.37	12.90	1.11	8.38	5.12
CoSER-8B	15.70	2.86	14.17	1.97	3.20	7.39	6.96	14.90	8.85	18.12	8.77	8.05
Llama-3.1-8B	14.34	4.11	20.09	1.93	4.16	3.58	7.82	12.41	13.47	7.81	10.04	6.23
(C) Ours												
$\mathcal{O}$SIM-0.6B-Mid	11.99	5.51	14.18	2.01	2.65	11.75	6.46	15.26	5.68	43.02	7.35	11.81
$\mathcal{O}$SIM-4B-Mid	8.23	8.01	9.67	10.06	2.09	44.62	4.65	21.53	4.26	**46.17**	5.28	26.08
$\mathcal{O}$SIM-8B-Mid	**7.62**	**8.48**	**9.00**	**12.44**	**2.01**	**44.73**	**4.36**	**22.49**	**4.03**	45.47	**4.95**	**26.72**

Midtraining changes the model's behavioral register.





BEHAVIORAL REGISTER

shorter responses · less Markdown
fewer generic assistant phrases

HumT Score

More human-like phrase

Post-training: A scalar reward cannot explain which social behavior failed.

SCALAR REWARD

$r = 0.71$

One number ranks the trajectory

but collapses distinct behaviors:

goal completion · naturalness

trust · privacy · secret keeping

The optimizer can improve the average while sacrificing a minority safety dimension.

retain why

VERBAL FEEDBACK

$(r, h) = J(x, y)$

h: *The response advances the goal, but reveals information the other participant should not know.*

The critique identifies a trainable correction without requiring a single correct answer.

DITTO converts the judge's explanation into on-policy supervision, then removes the judge at test time.

DITTO turns verbal critiques into on-policy learning.



Verbal feedback outperforms scalar rewards.

10 SOUL TASKS · QWEN3-VL-8B-INSTRUCT	Base	Scalar GRPO	DITTO
Average	0.533	0.678	**0.726**
UserLLM	0.469	0.863	**0.930**
Sotopia	0.277	0.423	**0.470**
ToMi	0.680	0.820	**0.930**

DITTO improves the average by 4.8 points over scalar GRPO and wins 8 of 10 tasks.

Distill 23 task experts into one model.

TRAIN SPECIALISTS

23 task experts
GRPO or DITTO

G = 8 responses / prompt
score with task reward

TopK + filter
deduplicate

58,702
examples

$$S(x, m) = \text{TopK}\ \{\ R(x, y, m)\ \}$$

$$D = \text{union over tasks m of}\ \{\ (x, y) : y \text{ in } S(x, m)\ \}$$

OdysSim-8B-Mid
distillation target

SFT on expert data

OdysSim-8B
one deployable simulator

Distillation merges incompatible task experts without averaging their weights.

Behavioral RL can reward the wrong behavior.



JUDGE MANIPULATION

Sotopia: judge-facing claims rise to 20–25%.
A detector penalty drives them near zero.

REWARD COLLAPSE

Humanual / CoSER favor short generic replies.
Rubric + length/overlap controls restore behavior.

Reward models need behavioral side constraints, not only a stronger optimizer.

OSim-8B reaches frontier-level results.









Behavioral training transfers to an unseen agent–user environment.





Artwork: Ryo Takemasa

THESIS CONCLUSION

AI agents do not exist in a vacuum.

01 **Interaction is all you need.**

Evaluate complete trajectories and their effects, not isolated outputs.

02 **Task completion is only the tip of the iceberg.**

Ask not only whether an agent finishes, but how it affects people and the environment.

03 **Humans are the final judge.**

Automated evaluators can scale research, but people decide what is useful, safe, and acceptable.



Artwork: Ryo Takemasa

GRATITUDE

Thank you.

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